On the Efficiency of 'Single Window'

Krishna B. Athreya and Monisankar Bishnu

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. We have used the expected queue length and the expected waiting time in the system at the stochastic steady state as measures of inefficiency of an approval system.

Keywords: Inefficiency; Single Window policy; Stochastic equilibrium; queueing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D73 O10 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-19
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Published in Economic Theory 2010, vol. 43 no. 2, pp. 207-226

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Journal Article: On the efficiency of ‘single window’ (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:13020

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