U.S. Trade Threats: Rhetoric or War?

Mylene Kherallah and John Beghin ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present an empirical analysis of factors determining trade wars and agreements under U.S. trade law Section 301. A system of two probit equations is estimated using historical data on Section 301 cases to determine which economic and political factors increase the likelihood of trade frictions. The likelihood of trade war increases when the United States's export share in the world market declines, when the United States is less dependent on the market of the targeted country, when foreign policy makers are in an election year, and when negotiations relate to highly protected and unionized industries in the targeted country.

Keywords: section 301; probit estimation; trade bargaining; US trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-02-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, February 1998, vol. 80 no. 1, pp. 15-29

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Related works:
Journal Article: U.S. Trade Threats: Rhetoric or War? (1998)
Working Paper: U.S. TRADE THREATS: RHETORIC OR WAR? (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:1537

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