On removing the Condorcet influence from pairwise elections data

Abhijit Chandra and Sunanda Roy

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Recent developments in voting theory show that Condorcet profiles embedded in electorates are responsible for conflicts between pairwise voting methods and for reversals of rankings under positional methods whenever candidates are dropped or added. Because of the strong symmetry of the rankings of the candidates within these profiles, it can be argued that Condorcet profiles represent complete ties between the candidates so far as election outcomes are concerned. Hence removing their influence from pairwise tallies should not matter and moreover is justified because of the distortions they induce. The paper discusses a method of removing or reducing the influence of Condorcet profiles from pairwise elections data.

Date: 2010-07-02
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