Reconciling Affirmative Action and Merit: Evidence and Design from India

Orhan Aygün and Bertan Turhan

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes India’s affirmative action system through the lens of market design, identifying a fundamental conflict between the Supreme Court rulings of Indra Sawhney (1992) and Ashoka Kumar Thakur (2008). While the former established the "over-and-above" principle and "within-category fairness," the latter introduced a specific cutoff mandate and de-reservation recommendation. We establish that these legal requirements are jointly incompatible, as no assignment rule can satisfy all resulting axioms simultaneously. By exploring alternative relaxations, we identify a family of rules supporting soft reservations, proving that the Forward Transfer rule is merit-dominant. Finally, we propose a reinterpreted cutoff policy that resolves legal inconsistencies and eliminates endogenous feedback, offering a superior meritocratic rule ready for immediate institutional implementation.

Date: 2026-04-23
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