Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets

Jose Alcalde

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale- Chapley stability and S-stability. The first one applies best to markets were no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem does not exist, and present a family of agents' preferences for which existence is guaranteed for both Gale-Shapley stable and t-stable outcomes.

Keywords: Matching marlqets; Rooinmate prohlem; Stahilit y. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1995-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published by Ivie

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1995-04.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1995 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Departamento de Edición ().