A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation

Ignacio Ortuño Ortín
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Ignacio Ortuño Ortín: Universidad de Alicante

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: A spatial model of party competition is studied in which, (i) Parties are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner. The policy implemented should be a compromise that considers the proposals made by the different parties. In the case of proportional representation this compromise is modelled as a convex combination of the proposed policies with weights proportional to the number of votes obtained by each party. We provide so me existence theorems and compare the equilibrium in our model with the equilibrium that exists under so me probabilistic models.. It is also shown that proportional representation will create incentives far the parties to announce radical platforms.

Keywords: Voting equilibrium; ideological parties; proportional representation; differentiated policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1996-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1996-01

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