Consistent beliefs, learning and different equilibria in oligopolistic markets

Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba Martos
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Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba Martos: Dpto. Teoría e Historia Económica
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gonzalo Fernandez-de-Cordoba

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the relation among equilibria in models with different levels of rationality. The different levels of rationality are defined in terms of the number of iterations that a player can perform with a simple rule for updating beliefs. It is shown that the rule converges to the Nash equilibrium without any increase in the complexity of players.

Keywords: Consistent beliefs; learning; rationality level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1996-16

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