- EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS IN OLIGOPOLY GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS

Martin Peitz

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.

Keywords: strategic complements; oligopoly; product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 1999-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1999-23.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1999 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium uniqueness in oligopoly games with strategic complements (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-23

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