MERGER POLICY IN R&D INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES

Ramón Faulí-Oller () and Maite Pastor
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Ramón Faulí-Oller: Universidad de Alicante
Maite Pastor: Universida CEU San Pablo

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We analyze merger policy in an industry where firms participate in a non-tournament R&D competition. We conclude that merger policy should be, in general, less restrictive in high technology markets (pharmaceuticals and telecoms), because mergers reduce the wasteful duplication of R&D expenditures. However, merger policy should become more strict in (very) asymmetric market structures. In this case, competition provides incentives for R&D, but, at the same time, duplication is avoided.

Keywords: Mergers; Antitrust; Research and Development. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2001-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2001-12

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