Can Conditional Transfers Eradicate Child Marriage?

Sajeda Amin, M Asadullah, Sara Hossain and Zaki Wahhaj
Additional contact information
Sajeda Amin: Population Council
Sara Hossain: Supreme Court of Bangladesh

No 118, IZA Policy Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Conditional cash transfers are increasingly being used by policymakers as a strategy to postpone the marriage of adolescent girls in developing countries. While this approach has met with success in the case of education and health programmes, it is unlikely, on its own, to address deeper issues related to child marriage, such as the agency of adolescent girls in their marriage decisions, sexual rights within marriage, and social norms within their own communities. We argue for a multi?dimensional, longer?term and holistic view of impact, that takes into account dimensions such as realized rights, health and access to education rather than cost?benefit based approaches that rely on single?focus indicators.

Keywords: cost benefit analysis; conditional transfers; South Asia; early marriage; poverty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 J16 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2016-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Can Conditional Transfers Eradicate Child Marriage? (2017)
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