Economic dishonesty depending on the level of temptation: a field experiment

Gerardo Sabater-Grande (), Maite Alguacil () and Noemí Herranz-Zarzoso ()
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Gerardo Sabater-Grande: LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain
Maite Alguacil: IIE and Departament of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain
Noemí Herranz-Zarzoso: Department of Economic Analysis, Universitat de València, Spain

No 2025/05, Working Papers from Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain)

Abstract: We implemented a two-phase experiment to investigate economic dishonest behavior in the field. In the first phase, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which subjects completed four questionnaires in exchange for being rewarded with €10 via bank transfer. In the second phase, subjects were randomly assigned to three treatment groups. One-third of the subjects were intentionally underpaid by €5, another third was overpaid with an extra of €5 and the final third received an additional €15 beyond the stipulated reward. To assess subjects’ awareness of these payments, we emailed upon their receipt data of the bank transfer. We found that overpaid participants overwhelmingly underreported the discrepancy compared to those who were underpaid, revealing a strong dishonesty pattern. After controlling for potential covariates, including socio-economics demographics, self-reported personality traits, cognitive ability, and measures of altruism and trustworthiness revealed in experimental games, it was observed that participants who received a larger overpayment exhibited greater honesty compared to those who were overpaid in a lesser extent. This finding suggests that as the level of temptation increases, the psychological costs of being dishonest may outweigh its monetary benefits.

Keywords: randomized field experiment; economic dishonesty; trustworthiness; altruism; cognitive ability, dark triad; HEXACO honesty-humility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-neu
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