On the Polarization Premium for radical parties in PR electoral systems

Anna-Sophie Kurella () and Salvatore Barbaro ()
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Anna-Sophie Kurella: University of Mannheim, Germany

No 2410, Working Papers from Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Abstract: Western democracies are grappling with escalating political polarization. While scholars have explored various societal and economic factors contributing to this phenomenon, the influence of the electoral system has received limited attention. In this paper, we argue that the use of the proportional representation system (PR), a common electoral approach, contributes to the rise in polarization. PR systems prioritize voters’ top preferences, allowing candidates to increase their electoral support even as the proportion of citizens strongly opposed to them grows. We formally demonstrate that PR systems incentivize candidates and parties to adopt extreme positions, a trend discouraged under the Borda count system. Using the Borda count as a benchmark, our empirical analyses with data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) confirm that polarizing candidates, often positioned at ideological extremes, benefit under PR voting rules. Our study reveals an additional asymmetric effect of PR systems, which disproportionately favors right-leaning polarizing candidates. This phenomenon is attributed to the more pronounced disagreement that far-right ideology provokes among moderate and left-leaning citizens compared to radical left ideologies.

Keywords: Elections; Voting Schemes; Political Polarization; Proportional Representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2024-06-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-pol
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