Electoral Methods and Political Polarization

Salvatore Barbaro ()

No 2411, Working Papers from Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Abstract: Research from various disciplines has addressed the relationships between electoral systems and political polarization. The results are inconclusive. This paper systematically examines how different electoral systems either promote political polarization or render it unattractive for candidates to distinguish themselves through polarization. We assume a polarized electorate and investigate Condorcet-consistent voting procedures as well as scoring rules, both single and two-staged.

Keywords: Elections; Voting Schemes; Political Polarization; Scoring Rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2024-06-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://download.uni-mainz.de/RePEc/pdf/Discussion_Paper_2411.pdf First version, 2024 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2411

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