Alternatives to Paying Efficiency Wages: Why No PEOPLEFAX?
Robert Tucker Omberg
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Robert Tucker Omberg: George Mason University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2020, vol. 35, issue 2, 77-88
Abstract:
Efficiency wage theories of unemployment predict that employers will pay employees above market-clearing wages to deter shirking by workers. However, paying supernormal wages may not be the only solution to this problem. When the Montgolfier Paper Mill encountered shirking and laborers who “left their employ[ers] when they tried to discipline them†(Horn, p. 37) in the 1780s, they instead made reforms, the most significant of which was the certificat de congeÌ , a “record of [each employee’s] previous employment and conduct†(Rosenband 1993, p. 233) maintained by the employer. Under this system, the Montgolfiers could pay normal market wages and still cause their workers to incur penalties for shirking. Legislative barriers in several modern jurisdictions prevent employers from giving detailed feedback on past employees to potential employers. ______________________________________________________
Keywords: efficiency wages; labor economics; history of management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J00 J53 N00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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