Queuing, Conflict, and Violence
Dwight R. Lee and
Robert D. Tollison
Additional contact information
Dwight R. Lee: University of Georgia and Ball State University
Robert D. Tollison: Clemson University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2009, vol. 25, issue 1, 51-68
Abstract:
Queuing in response to prices below market-clearing levels increases the potential for conflict and violence among consumers. We consider how the potential for violence in queues varies with differences in demand and supply characteristics of the goods being considered, and the cause of sub- market-clearing prices. In general, the potential for queue-related conflict and violence is greater when the price elasticities of demand and supply for the good are smaller and higher, respectively. Also, the potential for conflict and violence is greater when the queue results from government policy than when it results from private-sector activity.
Keywords: Conflict; Market-clearing price; Price elasticities; Violence; Queue; Economic Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://journal.apee.org/wp-content/uploads/journal/23367.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jpe:journl:552
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://journal.apee.org/article/fall2009_5/
Access Statistics for this article
The Journal of Private Enterprise is currently edited by Edward Peter Stringham
More articles in The Journal of Private Enterprise from The Association of Private Enterprise Education Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().