REITs and Their Management: An Analysis of Organizational Structure, Performance, and Management Compensation

Susanne Ethridge Cannon () and Stephen C. Vogt ()
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Susanne Ethridge Cannon: Department of Finance DePaul University 1 East Jackson Chicago, Illinois 60604, http://www.fin.depaul.edu/
Stephen C. Vogt: Department of Finance DePaul University 1 East Jackson Chicago, Illinois 60604, http://www.fin.depaul.edu/

Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995, vol. 10, issue 3, 297-318

Abstract: This study examines possible agency problems in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) by contrasting the performance, structure, and compensation of the two REIT forms from 1987 to 1992. Results show that "self-administered" REITs outperformed "advisor" REITs over the sample period even after adjusting for their greater market risk. Ownership structure significantly influences market performance of advisor REITs; low insider-owned advisor REITs both underperform and take on less market risk than other REITs. Ownership does not affect returns or market risk of self-administered REITs. While advisor compensation and chief executive officer salary appear to be strongly related to size, and chief executive officer salary is related to firm performance, there is only limited evidence that ownership structure affects managerial compensation in either REIT type.

JEL-codes: L85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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