Accessibility of Pareto Optima

Bernard Cornet
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Bernard Cornet: Department of Economics, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA

No 202605, WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS from University of Kansas, Department of Economics

Abstract: Non-tatonnement processes and planning procedures have been defined in different economic contexts, as dynamic processes to reach efficient allocations, with or without price adjustment, satisfying the property that, along the process, the utility of every agent is non-decreasing and transactions can occur, thus making a clear distinction with the study of tatonnement processes whose goal is to reach competitive equilibria with transactions occurring only at equilibrium. In this paper, we provide sufficient conditions guaranteeing that every Pareto optimum which is preferred or indifferent to some given initial situation by every agent is accessible by a monotone efficient dynamic process. The framework considered is general enough to encompass the accessibility of Pareto optima by a non-tatonnement barter process in an exchange economy, the neutrality of the MDP procedure in an economy with public goods, and other types of planning procedures.

Keywords: Non-tatonnement process; Barter and exchange process; Planning procedure; Pareto optima. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kan:wpaper:202605

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