Game Analysis of the Behavior of Participants in Green Supply Chain Finance Based on Digital Technology Platforms

Yitian Hong and Chuan Qin ()
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Yitian Hong: Xiamen University of Technology
Chuan Qin: Xiamen University of Technology

Computational Economics, 2025, vol. 65, issue 6, No 14, 3475-3502

Abstract: Abstract Similar to traditional supply chain finance (SCF) models, green supply chain finance (GSCF) also faces issues such as information asymmetry and heavy reliance on the creditworthiness of transaction parties. Under the influence of internet ideology, cracking down on traditional GSCF financing issues and transitioning from interpersonal trust to digital trust has become an inevitable trend. Achieving real-time, transparent, correlated, and traceable digital trust, digital technology (DT) platforms provide a solution. Based on the background of "Green Carbon Chain Pass" bill discounting financing business in the GSCF model of “Jian Dan Hui (JDH) platform”, game models are constructed involving small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), financial institutions (FIs), and core enterprises (CEs) in traditional model and after accessing the platform, based on game theory and considering the uncertainty in the decision-making process. The key factors influencing the strategic choices of the players and the impact mechanism of DT empowering the development of GSCF are explored. MATLAB software is used for simulation experiments. The results show that the cost of business operation, bill maturity values, discount rate, and losses caused by CEs not pay as agreed are important factors affecting the strategic choices of SMEs, FIs, and CEs; Accessing digital platform makes it easier to satisfy the conditions for the tripartite game to evolve into an ideal stable state; Splitting the value of supply chain bills by accessing digital platform can promote business cooperation between FIs and SMEs; The platform, relying on blockchain technology, encourages CEs to pay bills as agreed by increasing default losses; The platform relies on green ratings to motivate SMEs to apply for discounting financing through differentiated financing rates, while promoting their green management; Accessing to digital platform brings efficiency improvements and credit rewards, both of which encourage the three players to choose active financing strategies.

Keywords: Green supply chain finance; Digital technology; Tripartite game; Stochastic evolution; Empowerment mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10614-024-10667-5

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