Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?

Marc Quintyn

Constitutional Political Economy, 2009, vol. 20, issue 3, 267-295

Keywords: Financial supervision; Central banking; Independence; Accountability; Governance; Independent regulatory agencies; Regulatory state; G18; G28; H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9064-2

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