The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments: A Case Against Inequality Aversion

Antonio Filippin and Manuela Raimondi ()

De Economist, 2016, vol. 164, issue 1, 69-81

Abstract: In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: Public good; Inequality aversion; Altruism; C90; D63; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10645-015-9268-6

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