When imperfect collusion is profitable

Andrea Lofaro ()

Journal of Economics, 1999, vol. 70, issue 3, 235-259

Keywords: imperfect collusion; cartel stability; L13; L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:70:y:1999:i:3:p:235-259

DOI: 10.1007/BF01224738

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