Proprietary costs, governance and the segment disclosure decision

Ana Gisbert (), Begoña Navallas () and Domi Romero ()

Journal of Management & Governance, 2014, vol. 18, issue 3, 733-763

Abstract: Focusing on the Spanish setting, characterized by high ownership concentration and a regulatory framework that traditionally has given more priority to the avoidance of proprietary and competition costs related to disclosure than to promoting transparency, this paper aims to identify the main factors influencing the segment reporting decision. In particular, we aim to test whether the strength of concentrated ownership structures together with the persistence of the pre-IAS reporting philosophy offsets the role of independent directors. If this is the case, it would be in spite of the new IAS/IFRS reporting standards based on relevance and transparency, and would also run counter to the improvements in the Spanish governance framework which strengthens the presence of independent non-executive directors. The empirical evidence suggests that, under the new IAS/IFRS reporting philosophy, proprietary costs may have lost relevance due to the introduction of mandatory segment information requirements. In addition, within an institutional context of high ownership concentration, independent directors play a significant role in raising the level of reported information. The context of the new IFRS 8 offers opportunities to observe how governance and proprietary costs affect the new ‘management approach’ to segment classification. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Segment reporting; Agency theory; Proprietary costs; Independent directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-012-9243-4

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