Comparative Mixed Risk Aversion: Definition and Application to Self-Protection and Willingness to Pay
Kaïs Dachraoui,
Georges Dionne (),
Louis Eeckhoudt and
Philippe Godfroid
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2004, vol. 29, issue 3, 276 pages
Abstract:
We analyze the optimal choices of agents with utility functions whose derivatives alternate in sign, an important class that includes most of the functions commonly used in economics and finance (Mixed Risk Aversion, MRA, Caballé and Pomansky, 1996). We propose a comparative mixed risk aversion definition for this class of utility functions, namely, "More Risk Averse MRA", and provide a sufficient condition to compare individuals. We apply the model to optimal prevention and willingness to pay. More risk averse MRA agents spend less to reduce accident probabilities that are above 1/2. They spend more only when accident probabilities are below 1/2. Explanations in terms of risk premiums are provided. The results presented also allow for the presence of background risk.
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)
Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0895-5646/contents (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Comparative mixed risk aversion: definition and application to self-protection and willingness to pay (2004)
Working Paper: Comparative mixed risk aversion: Definition and application to self-protection and willingness to pay (2004) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:29:y:2004:i:3:p:261-276
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11166/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty is currently edited by W. Kip Viscusi
More articles in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().