Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union

Roel Beetsma and Lans Bovenberg

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 102, issue 3-4, 247-69

Abstract: This paper explores the conditions under which a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with the convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the union once the EMU has been established is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend mainly on the monetary arrangements in the union. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union (1996)
Working Paper: Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union (1995)
Working Paper: Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union (1995)
Working Paper: Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union (1995)
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