Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland

Lars Feld

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 105, issue 1-2, 125-64

Abstract: Tax competition is supposed to lead to the collapse of the welfare state because, first, it will become difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy a redistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, and second, such a policy, if undertaken in one jurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from other jurisdictions and erode internal redistribution policies. In this paper, the impact of personal income taxes and transfers on residence decisions of taxpayers is analyzed with Swiss subfederal data. The relationship of tax competition and the erosion of the Swiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data on income redistribution. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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