The Importance of Uncertainty in a Two-Stage Theory of Constitutions

Dennis Mueller ()

Public Choice, 2001, vol. 108, issue 3-4, 223-58

Abstract: This paper analyzes the consequences of different assumptions regarding the kind of uncertainty that exists at the constitutional stage of a two-stage political process. Individuals at the constitutional stage decide the actions that are to be allowed, compelled or banned in the subsequent stage. The analysis allows us to specify conditions under which certain bans and obligations might be included in a constitution, while others are decided by legislative action, to define the "optimal voting rule", and the conditions under which the majority rule is this optimal rule. The paper provides a unified framework for analyzing the choice of institutions in a two-stage constitutional political system. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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