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The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections

Antoine Auberger and Eric Dubois

Public Choice, 2005, vol. 125, issue 3, 363-383

Abstract: This article's aim consists in building and estimating a model which explains and forecasts the outcomes of the French legislative elections by department. This model, which constitutes the first attempt for such a geographical level, emphasises the role of the economic and political factors in the explanation of the legislative vote. The model seems to be very accurate in forecasting the elections of the past at the local and national level. Furthermore, its behaviour for the 2002 election was very satisfactory. This model is therefore a reliable alternative to the vote intention polls as an electoral forecasting instrument. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: The Influence of Local and National Economic Conditions on French Legislative Elections (2005) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3056-9

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