On the optimal number of representatives

Emmanuelle Auriol and Robert Gary-Bobo ()

Public Choice, 2012, vol. 153, issue 3, 419-445

Abstract: We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good results. We then discuss the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States has too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape and barriers to entrepreneurship. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Representative democracy; Number of representatives; Constitution design; Incentives; D7; H11; H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Optimal Number of Representatives (2012)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Number of Representatives (2008)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Number of Representatives (2007)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Number of Representatives (2000)
Working Paper: On the Optimal Number of Representatives (1998)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3

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