Electoral cycles in active labor market policies

Mario Mechtel and Niklas Potrafke

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 156, issue 1, 194 pages

Abstract: We examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote (short term) job-creation. Such policies reduce measures of unemployment. Using German state data for the period 1985 to 2004, we show that election-motivated politicians pushed job-promotion schemes before elections. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Political business cycles; Opportunistic politicians; Active labor market policies; P16; J08; H72; E62; H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral cycles in active labor market policies (2013)
Working Paper: Electoral Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies (2011)
Working Paper: Electoral Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:181-194

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9890-z

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