Does electoral competition affect politicians’ trade policy preferences? Evidence from Japan

Banri Ito

Public Choice, 2015, vol. 165, issue 3, 239-261

Abstract: This study examines the effect of electoral competition on politicians’ trade policy preferences using candidate observations from the House of Representatives in Japan’s 2012 general election. The study clarifies the effects of constituency size and the electoral strength of constituencies on candidates’ political stances. The empirical results provide evidence that politicians’ preferences for trade policy are sensitive to electoral pressure, but their reactions differ depending on the characteristics of each constituency. The results reveal that for a broad constituency with a large concentration of agricultural workers, election candidates are more likely to support protectionism than their counterparts running in a narrow constituency. For city district election candidates, electoral strength measured by the vote margin significantly affects their trade policy preferences. Candidates in close elections are more likely to be protectionist than candidates elected by a substantial majority, suggesting that electoral pressures deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Trade policy; Protectionism; Election; Constituency size; D72; F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0306-3

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