Examining the public interest rationale for regulating whiskey with the pure food and drugs act

Daniel J. Smith () and Macy Scheck
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Daniel J. Smith: Jones College of Business at Middle Tennessee State University
Macy Scheck: Jones College of Business at Middle Tennessee State University

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 196, issue 1, No 4, 85-122

Abstract: Abstract Was there legitimate public interest justification for regulating whiskey with the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906? High and Coppin (Bus Hist Rev 62:286–309, 1988) provide evidence for a public choice interpretation of the application of the act to the whiskey industry. However, the existence of public choice factors does not preclude the simultaneous existence of genuine public interest rationales. The public interest justification was that rectifiers, who flavored neutral spirits to replicate straight whiskey, commonly adulterated whiskey with poisonous ingredients. We examine these claims using alcohol consumption data, chemical tests of whiskey, trade book recipes, and reported deaths and poisonings from whiskey. We find that poisons were infrequently used in rectified whiskey and that the poisons used were overwhelmingly either not fully understood to be dangerous at that time or were demanded in underground markets. The historical evidence bolsters the public choice interpretation of High and Coppin (1988).

Keywords: Public choice; Public interest; Whiskey; Pure Food and Drugs Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D52 D72 K20 N81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01061-0

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