Relationship lobbying through repeated contributions: a humanomics approach

David Mitchell (), Todd Nesbit () and Gary A. Wagner ()
Additional contact information
David Mitchell: Ball State University
Todd Nesbit: Ball State University
Gary A. Wagner: University of Louisiana

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 202, issue 3, No 14, 557-576

Abstract: Abstract Previous scholarly investigations of the effectiveness of political lobbying are abundant but have not yet reached a consensus. This study incorporates the work of Adam Smith, Vernon Smith, and Deidre McCloskey to consider the question from a new perspective, that of humanomics, with its emphasis on the efficacy and significance of human relationships. In doing so, we test the proposition that lobbying is neither a one-time quid pro quo nor reducible to dollars and cents but most often is based on a relationship between the lobbyist and the lobbied that has developed over time. We explore the impact of a more powerful executive branch by analyzing the efforts to lobby people who are or may become governors of US states. We estimate the effect of new term limits for state legislators (adopted from 2000 to 2015) on political donations to governors, lieutenant governors, attorneys general, and secretaries of state. If, as we suspect, shorter terms of office for legislators undermine the likelihood of durable lobbyist-legislator relationships, it follows that lobbyists will shift their focus, proxied by repeat-contribution behavior, toward the executive branch. Our findings indicate that that, indeed, is what happens, offering empirical evidence that relationship-building over time is a key component of the effort to exercise political influence.

Keywords: Social Capital; Lobbying; Rent seeking; Regulatory capture; Term limits; Relationship lobbying; Cognitive capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G28 G34 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01231-8

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