What factors drive cross-country economic freedom convergence?

James E. Payne (), James W. Saunoris (), Saban Nazlioglu () and Russell S. Sobel ()
Additional contact information
James E. Payne: Oklahoma State University
James W. Saunoris: Eastern Michigan University
Saban Nazlioglu: Pamukkale University
Russell S. Sobel: The Citadel

Public Choice, 2025, vol. 204, issue 3, No 10, 529-559

Abstract: Abstract Are the economic freedom levels of all countries converging now that the Cold War is over? If not, are they converging into a subset of economic freedom groups or ‘clubs’ based upon underlying legal origins and country characteristics? This study investigates these questions using recent methodological developments in panel data convergence analysis. Our tests indicate non-convergence of economic freedom across all countries. However, club convergence tests reveal three distinct convergence clubs. Our subsequent results demonstrate that countries belonging to the higher economic freedom convergence clubs are less likely to have French legal origin and lower reliance on natural resource rents, and more likely to have long tenured and democratic governments, easier exitability, more net migration, faster economic growth, more control of corruption, as well as more elderly and dense populations.

Keywords: Economic freedom; Institutions; Legal origins; Convergence; Panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-024-01254-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:204:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01254-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01254-1

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().