Reverse revenue sharing: A modest proposal

Dwight Lee

Public Choice, 1985, vol. 45, issue 3, 279-289

Abstract: While no claim is made that reverse revenue sharing is, even from a private interest perspective, the best fiscal arrangement, it has been argued that it represents an improvement over current arrangements in important ways. Still, reverse revenue sharing surely will be seen by most as a rather extreme proposal. For some this will come from the fact that it is the public interest model of government that remains dominant in structuring their view of the political process. But even those who accept the private interest model of government will see the proposal as extreme in terms of its political infeasibility. The very considerations that make the decentralization of the reverse revenue proposal desirable (i.e., reducing the power of political interest groups) make it unlikely that it will generate enthusiastic political support. Indeed, few things would provide more compelling evidence that reverse revenue sharing is a badly flawed proposal than the formation of an effective coalition of political interests in favor of it. I conclude this paper with confidence that the case for reverse revenue sharing is completely safe from this damaging prospect. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985

Date: 1985
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00124025 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:45:y:1985:i:3:p:279-289

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00124025

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().