On Proportional Non-representation

Gianluigi Galeotti

Public Choice, 1994, vol. 80, issue 3-4, 359-70

Abstract: This paper contends the main virtue conventionally attributed to proportional electoral rules (i.e., effective representation of political views). It discusses a number of shortcomings that lead too much proportionality to a self-defeat: it reduces vote mobility through the strong cultivation of voters loyalties; it smooths out vote variations when transforming them into seat variations; it reinforces intraparty ties to the detriment of vertical attention to constituents and it impinges on the working of checks-and-balances. The paper does not aim at a systematic evaluation of the properties of various voting systems, nor is it the proportional principle as such that is under attack. However, its combination with other institutional features can entrap voters in their own choices, thus nurturing political collusion. It is because of the ensuing lower influence of the voters on political decision-making that too much proportionality can lead to poor representation. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1994
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