The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts

Afshad Irani ()

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2004, vol. 22, issue 1, 15-28

Abstract: This study examines the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the relevance of company-sponsored conference calls. Measuring relevance by a conference call's ability to improve analyst forecast accuracy and consensus, I find larger improvements in both variables during the period surrounding conference calls in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. These findings imply that in the post-FD era relatively more about a firm's upcoming earnings becomes known during conference calls, consistent with FD's success in eliminating selective disclosure. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: regulation fair disclosure; conference calls; selective disclosure; forecast accuracy; forecast consensus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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DOI: 10.1023/B:REQU.0000006184.02165.c5

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