Computational complexity in the design of voting rules

Koji Takamiya () and Akira Tanaka ()

Theory and Decision, 2016, vol. 80, issue 1, 33-41

Abstract: This paper considers the computational complexity of the design of voting rules, which is formulated by simple games. We prove that it is an NP -complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: Computational complexity; NP-completeness; Simple game; Core; Stability; Nakamura number (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:80:y:2016:i:1:p:33-41

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9422-7

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