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Evidence, causality, and sequential choice

Gerard J. Rothfus ()
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Gerard J. Rothfus: The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Theory and Decision, 2024, vol. 97, issue 4, No 2, 613-636

Abstract: Abstract Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.

Keywords: Newcomb's problem; Causal decision theory; Decision trees; Dynamic consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-09990-y

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