A characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures

Clinton Gubong Gassi ()
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: University Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), F-25000

Theory and Decision, 2025, vol. 99, issue 3, No 2, 557-572

Abstract: Abstract We study cooperative games in which the set of feasible coalitions is determined by the winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of game models real-life situations where certain agents have production capacities, while others possess the legal authority required to produce. In this paper, we characterize the Myerson value for this class of games by using five independent axioms. We show that the Myerson value is the only allocation rule on the set of voting structures that satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, the extra-null player property, and equal treatment of veto.

Keywords: TU-game; Voting structure; Harsanyi dividends; Harsanyi power solution; Myerson value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10030-6

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