On the Convergence of Logit Equilibrium in Order Statistic Games

Kang-oh Yi
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Kang-oh Yi: Sogang University

Korean Economic Review, 2006, vol. 22, 69-82

Abstract: This paper identifies the conditions under which rational players can reach an inefficient equilibrium as if they make choices ignoring their own influences on the game outcome in a logit equilibrium model of order statistic game. It is shown that, if the number of players increases sufficiently faster than the noise paramemter, the game outcome depends entirely on the prespecified order-statistic and the number of players, and inefficient outcome could result.

Keywords: order statistic game; quantal response equilibrium; logit equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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