Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining

James Andreoni, Marco Castillo () and Ragan Petrie

Korean Economic Review, 2009, vol. 25, 35-63

Abstract: The ultimatum game has been the primary tool for studying bar-gaining behavior in recent years. However, not enough information is gathered in the ultimatum game to get a clear picture of responders�� utility functions. We analyze a convex ultimatum game in which responders�� can ��shrink�� an offer as well as to accept or reject it. This allows us to observe enough about responders�� preferences to estimate utility functions. We use data collected from convex ultimatum games to successfully predict behavior in standard games. Rejections can be ��rationalized�� with neo-classical preferences over own- and other-payoff that are convex, nonmonotonic, and regular.

Keywords: Ultimatum Game; Bargaining Behavior; Revealing Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-20090630-25-1-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining (2005)
Working Paper: Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining (2005)
Working Paper: Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining (2005)
Working Paper: Revealing preferences for fairness in ultimatum bargaining (2004)
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