Logit Solution and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Person Games

Kang-Oh Yi
Additional contact information
Kang-Oh Yi: Sogang University

Korean Economic Review, 2009, vol. 25, 289-298

Abstract: This paper studies the properties of logit solution as a limit of logit equilibrium, where mistake probabilities depend in plausible ways on their expected costs. This dependence sometimes allows logit solution to select an equilibrium that differs from the risk-dominant equilibrium in 2��2 games. This paper also identifies a sufficient condition for logit solution to follow risk-dominance in 2��2 games.

Keywords: Quantal Response Equilibrium; Logit Solution; Equilibrium Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-20091231-25-2-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20091231-25-2-05

Access Statistics for this article

Korean Economic Review is currently edited by Kyung Hwan Baik

More articles in Korean Economic Review from Korean Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by KEA ().