Entry Invoking

Jeong-Yoo Kim and Sawoong Kang
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Sawoong Kang: Handong Global University

Korean Economic Review, 2014, vol. 30, 247-271

Abstract: We consider a vertically integrated incumbent and an entrant who is privately informed of his production cost and is going to enter the downstream industry. We introduce the concept of the entry invoking behavior of a potential entrant. By ��entry invoking behavior,��we mean the entrant��s offer of a higher input price than his first best price under full information to convey the information that his entry benefits the incumbent as well. A high price signals a low cost of the entrant and accordingly a high profit of the integrated firm in a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, only the efficient (low-type) entrant enters the market, although some efficiency loss in signaling may be incurred. This signaling consideration casts a doubt on the efficiency of the retail-minus access price regulation. We also discuss the possibility of inefficient entry in a pooling equilibrium.

Keywords: Entry Invoking; Foreclosure; Signal; Vertical Integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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