Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly

Kenji Fujiwara ()

No 51, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of Efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.

Keywords: Di erential game; Asymmetric oligopoly; Feedback strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2010-04, Revised 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp51.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:51

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