Voracity, growth and welfare

Kenji Fujiwara ()

No 77, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: This paper explores some implications of the comparison between feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for growth and welfare in a `voracity' model. We show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a lower growth rate while it leaves both the leaders and the followers better o , i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Dynamic game; Growth; Welfare; Feedback Nash equilibrium; Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2011-09, Revised 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-fdg
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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp77.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:77

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