Noncooperative vs. Minimum-Rate Commodity Taxation

Morten Hvidt and Søren Nielsen

No 99-18, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper demonstrates, within a simple two-country model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping, that the tax revenue (welfare) effects of a minimum tax requirement depend crucially on the character of the initial noncooperative tax equilibrium, i.e. whether it is Nash or Stackelberg.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Non‐cooperative vs. Minimum‐Rate Commodity Taxation (2001)
Journal Article: Non-cooperative vs. Minimum- Rate Commodity Taxation (2001)
Working Paper: NONCOOPERATIVE vs MINIMUM-RATE COMMODITY TAXATION (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:epruwp:99-18

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