Sorting and wage premiums in immoral work

Florian H. Schneider, Fanny Brun and Roberto A. Weber
Additional contact information
Florian H. Schneider: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Fanny Brun: Independent researcher
Roberto A. Weber: Department of Economics, University of Zurich

No 24-12, CEBI working paper series from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI)

Abstract: We use surveys, laboratory experiments and administrative data to study how heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work and in workers aversion to acting immorally impact labor market outcomes. Immoral work is associated with higher wages, both in administrative data and in causal experimental evidence. Individuals more willing to engage in immoral conduct find employment in firms and industries perceived as immoral less aversive and have higher employment rates in immoral work in the laboratory. These phenomena appear to be driven by impure social motives, reflecting a desire not to be involved with immoral work, rather than by consequentialist concerns.

Keywords: Wage premium; immoral behavior; impure social preferences; sorting; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 102
Date: 2024-05-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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