Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry

Finn Tarp, Sam Jones and Felix Schilling
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Sam Jones: UNU-WIDER, Mozambique
Felix Schilling: Copenhagen Business School

No 21-08, DERG working paper series from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Development Economics Research Group (DERG)

Abstract: We link the universe of owners of businesses formally registered in Mozambique since Independence to a new database of politically exposed persons. Recreating the dynamic network of ties between firm owners, we estimate the value of party political and executive mandates to their personal business interests. We find holders of political office attain significantly faster growth not only in the number of companies they own but also in their structural power within the business-owner network, as measured by their ‘godfather centrality’. Such growth is concentrated in joint-stock firms active in trade and finance sectors and is even larger once we aggregate the analysis to the family-name level. This is consistent with politicians accumulating private sector wealth by acting as rentier-brokers.

Keywords: firm registry; beneficial ownership; political connections; rent-seeking; Mozambique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G30 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 76
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuderg:2108

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