When Aspiring and Rational Agents Strive to Coordinate

Jaideep Roy

No 00-16, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behaviour is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.

Keywords: coordination; evolution of aspiration; myopic Optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2000-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2000/0016.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0016

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().