Crowding in School Choice

William Phan (), Ryan Tierney and Yu Zhou

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University

Abstract: We consider the problem of matching students to schools when students are able to express preferences over crowding. For example, schools have varying per capita ex penditures, average teacher-student ratios, etc. These characteristics of a school are now endogenously determined-matchings with more students to a particular school decrease each of the variables above. We propose a new equilibrium notion, the Rationing Crowding Equilibrium (RCE), that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. We prove the existence of RCE under mild domain conditions, and establish a Rural Hospitals Theorem and welfare lattice result on the set of RCE. The latter implies the existence of a maximal RCE, and that such RCE are student-optimal. Moreover, the mechanism defined by selection from the maximal RCE correspondence is strategy-proof. We also identify an algorithm to find a maximal RCE for a natural subdomain.

Keywords: School; choice; with; crowding;; Rationing; crowding; equilibrium;; Student; optimality;Strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D62 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Crowding in School Choice (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:epaper:e-21-006

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